Introduction
Particularly relevant to our analysis is Krass et al. (2013) who look at …rms'reaction to environmental regulations (tax, subsidy, and rebate levels) and show that increasing carbon taxes does not monotonically increase …rms'adoption of green technology. The intuition is that when taxes are very high, …rms'production quantity can be so small that switching to cleaner technology generates insu¢ cient additional pro…t to o¤set the …xed cost of adopting the technology. Perino and Requate (2012) also show that the relationship between policy stringency and the rate of technology adoption is an inverted U-shape for a broad class of technologies. Our model shares such features.
On the empirical side, Aghion et al. (2016) show that, in the auto industry, …rms are more likely to innovate in clean technologies if they are confronted with higher tax-inclusive fuel prices. Yang et al. (2012) examine whether stringent environmental regulations induce more R&D and promote productivity in Taiwan, China's manufacturing industry and …nd that stricter regulations are positively related to R&D expenditures and industrial productivity.
The Model
We consider an economy where a continuum of …rms (of mass one) produce a …nal good, which is sold in the world market at a price p, which we normalize to one. Denoting output by x, and assuming a convex cost function c(x) = 1 2 x 2 , the pro…ts of …rm i at time t are given by
Production causes carbon emissions, e it , which are proportional to output levels and depend on the technology adopted by the …rm. More precisely, we assume that e it = k j x it , j 2 fd; cg, where d stands for dirty, and c for clean technology, 3 and k d > k c . The cost of adopting the clean technology, i , varies across …rms and we let i be uniformly distributed over the interval [ i , i ]. We further assume that there are no private costs associated with emissions, and that there is no cap and trade system that allows …rms to sell "pollution rights." Hence, …rms adopt the clean technology only if it yields higher pro…ts. The timing of the model is as follows:
-The government announces a carbon emission limit ! BT t , for t = f0,1g, that all …rms should abide by. The limit is consistent with a carbon emission target that is exogenously decided (e.g., as part of an international agreement);
-Firms announce whether they are considering adopting a (costly) clean technology in period 0 or not (cheap talk).
At time t = 0 -Unexpectedly, a new government gains power and tweets a new carbon emission cap ! T t , which is not consistent with , that is, ! -Firms make production plans.
At time t = 1 -With probability 1 , the current government is replaced by a new government that sets a carbon emission limit ! AT that is consistent with ;
-If this happens, …rms adjust their production plans, but not the technology that is already set, according to the new limit.
Before Transition (t = 1)
Recall that the government is committed to cap the sum of total carbon emissions in periods 0 and 1 to . Absent carbon emission limits, …rms have no incentives to adopt the clean technology and they produce
Denoting total "unregulated" carbon emissions by e , we have that e = k d (b x 0 + b x 1 ) = 2k d ; no …rm will upgrade to the clean technology because it is costly (see below). If a limit ! t is put in place, the output of a …rm of type j is given by
To simplify the analysis, we consider situations in which the government is committed to a target that is stringent enough. More precisely, we assume that
so that, even if all …rms switched to the clean technology, a carbon limit will still be needed to meet the target. 4 Notice that this implies that k c > ! t . We also assume that the government cannot verify the technology adopted by the …rms and cannot impose a limit that is contingent on the technology adopted. Under such assumptions, and assuming no discounting, total pro…ts of a …rm of type j are given by
We further assume that the government is benevolent, and that it chooses ! 0 and ! 1 to meet the target at the smallest cost for the …rms. In our set-up, where all …rms share the same concave pro…t function, the least costly carbon limits that are consistent with are necessarily
Substituting now (5) into (4), we can express the variable pro…ts of clean and dirty …rms as
respectively. Hence, a …rm adopts the clean technology i¤ the cost i of adopting the clean technology for …rm i is low enough, that is,
and the fraction BT of …rms that adopt the clean technology is given by
Transition
We now consider a situation where a new government, unexpectedly voted into o¢ ce in period 0, decides that the carbon target is no more binding and that carbon emission limits can be increased. How would such a policy a¤ect …rms'decisions to invest in clean technologies and, ultimately, their pro…tability? To answer this, assume that the government decides to depart from and sets a new emission cap
For the sake of simplicity, and recognizing that it is often di¢ cult to completely rewrite a regulatory framework, we start by considering the e¤ect of small changes in regulation. Hence, we assume that
so that, even if all …rms switched to the clean technology, a carbon limit will still be needed to meet the revised target. Again, if the government continues choosing ! 0 and ! 1 to meet the target at the smallest cost for the …rms, 5 we have that
As we already mentioned, the change in the regulatory framework can be temporary. Indeed, in period 1, with probability (1 ), the government will be voted out of o¢ ce. When this happens, the new government sets an emission limit ! AT that restores the original commitment of capping total emissions at . Of course, such a limit is stricter than ! BT because it has to compensate for the increase in period 0's emissions. We thus have that
and we work under the assumption that z < ;
The expected variable pro…ts of a …rm of type j are then given by
where E is the expectation operator and
Using these expressions, (13) can be written as
Hence, …rm i will adopt the clean technology i¤
(17) and the fraction T of …rms that adopts the clean technology is given by
Firms'Responses
In the remaining of the paper, we discuss how a relaxation in the regulatory standards is likely to a¤ect …rms'incentives to switch from the dirty to the clean technology and, ultimately, their pro…tability. We also discuss whether, and under which circumstances, a subset of …rms may …nd it to be in their self interest to abide by standards that are stricter than the prevailing ones.
Cleaner or dirtier?
In order to assess how a relaxation in environmental standards may a¤ect …rms' decisions regarding technology adoption, we focus our attention on the interesting case in which BT 2 ( i ; i ) and thus a fraction BT > 0 of …rms would be interested in adopting the clean technology before the change in regulation occurs. We now ask the question of whether the relaxation in the emission cap will increase or decrease the number of …rms that decide to switch to the clean technology. Our main …nding is that:
, a small increase in the emission cap z, z < e z ( b ), induces more …rms to adopt the clean technology; a large increase has the opposite e¤ ect. The higher is the probability that standards are not reversed in the next period, the larger is e z.
Proof: In Appendix.
Notice that Proposition 1 does not mean that a relaxation in the emission cap, by inducing …rms to adopt a cleaner technology, is good for the environment. In our set-up, the total amount of emissions is independent of the choice of the technology and higher caps necessarily mean more emissions. The reason why …rms may be induced to switch to the clean technology is that, when < b , an increase in the emission limits increases the pro…ts associated with the use of the clean technology more than those associated with the dirty one. 6 This follows directly from the concavity of the pro…t function and the linear cost of adopting the clean technology. 7 In addition, the shift in technology adoption induced by the relaxation of the emission standards is magni…ed, in either direction, if the probability that the government remains in power increases, so that policy reversals become less likely.
8 Figure 1 below, illustrates the di¤erent forces at play. If emission standards are pretty tight to start with, = a , their relaxation by an amount z increases the pro…ts of clean …rms (in green) more than those of the dirty ones (in brown). This induces more …rms to adopt the clean technology and the more so if current policies are likely to stay. However, if emission standards are initially laxer, = b , their relaxation by the same amount z, increases the pro…ts of the dirty …rms more than those of the clean …rms, and this induces more …rms to keep the current dirty technology. Indeed, what drives the …rms' technological decision is the comparison between the …xed cost of adoption and the di¤erence in the pro…ts associated with the two technologies.
Let us now consider the e¤ect of a change in emission standards on industry pro…tability. Total expected pro…ts E[ ] are given by
where the last term denotes the cost of adopting the clean technology (for the …rms that adopt it). We can now prove that Proposition 2 If the probability that the current government remains in power in period 1 is small enough, <
, then a relaxation of the emission limit decreases the pro…tability of the industry; the opposite is true if > z (2kc )
. 6 Indeed, we have that
To get a better understanding of the di¤erent forces at play, we considered a more general model, à la Perino and Requate (2012) where pro…t functions are concave, and …rms choose among a continuum of technologies whose cost of adoption is increasing and convex in how green they are. In such a model, the e¤ect of an increase in an emission quota depends upon the third derivative of the pro…t function. In the case of a quadratic pro…t function, a small increase in the emission quota leads to an increase in the adoption of green technologies, while a larger increase has the opposite e¤ect (as in our model). Instead, with constant returns to scale, …rms always adopt greener technologies when quotas are relaxed. We thank Quy-Toan Do for pointing this out. 8 It is immediate to verify that Proposition 2 suggests that changes in emission standards that are designed to increase …rms'pro…tability may end up having the opposite e¤ect if the probability that they are reversed in the future is high, and technology cannot quickly adapt to the new regulations. The reason is that, in order to undo the damages that current policies are going to in ‡ict on the environment, …rms may end up facing draconian emission cuts in the future and this may negatively a¤ect their (expected) pro…tability; this despite the fact that (expected) emissions also increase.
Finally, it may be worth remarking that the conditions set in Proposition 2 are su¢ cient conditions for an increase and a decrease in pro…tability, as they require all …rms to gain or lose from the relaxation in the emission standards. This greatly simpli…es the analysis as it allows us to ignore the e¤ects of technological changes (induced by the change in policies) on the industry's pro…tability. We will discuss this in the robustness section below.
The California E¤ect
The question we discuss in this section is whether a subset of …rms may …nd it in their self-interest to abide by emission standards that are stricter than those imposed by the government. We also discuss whether such a strategy is more likely to pro…t those …rms that adopt (or are prone to adopt) the clean or the dirty technology.
The fact that …rms may want stricter standards (if they anticipate that the current ones may be reversed) follows directly from Proposition 2. Indeed, when all …rms are made worse o¤ by the changes in the emission standards, they are necessarily better o¤ if they can reverse them. Hence, the grand coalition of …rms would necessarily …nd it in its self-interest to abide by stricter emission standards. The problem is that such a coalition is not stable: any (in…nitesimal) …rm will be better o¤ by deviating from the stricter standards and free riding on the grand "green" coalition. This means that self-imposed standards may not work, and stricter standards may need to be enforced by subnational authorities, such as states. And if a state is large enough, it may …nd it in the interest of its …rms to issue tougher emission standards even if other states do not follow.
But let us proceed by steps. First, we want to …nd out what is the smallest subset of …rms , 2 [0; 1], that would …nd it optimal to abide by stricter emission standards, if such standards were externally enforced. If a subset of …rms decides to abide by a tougher standard ! T " and join the "green coalition,"we would have that e
Now, the total expected variable pro…ts of a …rm of type j belonging to the "green coalition" are given by
We can then prove Proposition 3 If the probability that the current government remains in power in period 1 is small enough, < z 2kj
, there exists a < 1, such that any coalition of …rms of type j and of size > would gain from a stricter emission cap. is smaller for the …rms adopting a clean technology.
According to Proposition 3, if current lax standards are likely to be reversed in the future, then a subset of …rms may prefer to abide by stricter emission standards today and tomorrow to be able to better "smooth" emissions (and production) over time. The problem, as we already mentioned, is that such a coalition is not stable. However, states may impose tougher standards (even if this is currently disputed in the U.S.). Do they have an interest in doing so? If states are small, they will face a free-rider problem similar to the one faced by individual …rms. However, if a state is big enough, then it can unilaterally decide to impose stricter standards, and this may be in its …rms'interest even if other states do not follow.
Notice that, in Proposition 3, we only considered coalitions of homogeneous …rms, that is, of …rms that have adopted either a clean or a dirty technology. The analysis can easily be extended to the case of mixed coalitions. In this case, the larger is the share of …rms adopting the clean technology, the smaller is the coalition of …rms that …nd it in their self-interest to abide by stricter emission standards. This, in turn, implies that the larger a state is, and the larger is its share of clean …rms, the more likely it is that such a state is willing to impose stricter environmental standards. This is what we christen as the California e¤ect.
Robustness

Large Changes in Regulation
In the previous analysis, we focused our attention on small changes in regulation assuming that z < 2k c . In this section, we relax such an assumption and allow for any regulatory change that is compatible with assumption (A.3). First, it is important to notice that if the new emission cap is such that + z > 2k d , then it is non-binding and we can ignore it. Hence, in what follows, without loss of generality, we restrict our attention to the case in which 2k d > z > 2k c . When z belongs to such an interval, the emission limit is binding in period 0 only for the …rms that operate with the dirty technology. This implies that b x
and hence that b
. In addition, we have that b e = b k c + (1 b ) +z 2 , so that, in period 1, if a new government is voted into o¢ ce, it will set a limit b ! AT = b e. Thus, b T is the i that satis…es both
. While we are able to solve explicitly for the share of …rms that adopt the clean technology and thus for the industry pro…ts associated with di¤erent changes in emission standards, the expressions are quite convoluted. We thus present our results with the help of numerical simulation. They are summarized in the …gures below, where we plot b and E[ ] as a function of z, in the interval [0, ], for di¤erent values of the probability that new emission standards would last, . In Figure 2 , we set < b , and in Figure  9 3, > b . In the case of stringent emission caps, Figure 2 , the relation between the number of …rms that adopt the clean technology and the emission limits is hump shaped. The higher is the probability that policies are not reversed, the higher is the fraction of …rms that adopt the clean technology. The e¤ect of the relaxation of the emission standards on industry pro…tability also depends upon the probability that the new standards are going to be repealed. The higher the latter is (low value of ), the more likely it is that laxer emission standards negatively a¤ect industry's pro…tability.
Let us now move to the situation, depicted in Figure 3 , where the original emission targets were less stringent. Also in this case, higher emission caps increase expected pro…ts if they are likely to be permanent, and they reduce them if the probability that they are reversed is high. The number of …rms switching to clean technology decreases the laxer the new standards are. Finally, we …nd that, for low values of z; the higher the likelihood of a policy reversal, the higher is the number of …rms adopting the clean technology. The opposite happens for high values of z.
Conclusions
In this paper, we have attempted to explain two, somewhat surprising, developments following President Trump's decision to withdraw the United States from the Paris accord on climate change. First, private …rms have continued to invest in clean technologies. Second, some state governments have decided to impose stricter environmental standards in the wake of weaker standards at the federal level. Using a simple model, we showed that pro…t-maximizing …rms could increase the use of clean technologies because the increased output that these technologies permit raises pro…ts by more than what the dirty technologies allow. This e¤ect is stronger if …rms believe that the change in the standards is permanent. However, we also showed that, if the relaxed emissions standards are likely to be reversed, industries will face a decline in expected pro…ts-unless …rms are able to form a coalition to adhere to stricter environmental standards. Since such a coalition is unstable, one possibility is for state governments, especially those of large states, to impose the standards.
While these explanations stem from a simple model, they provide important insights not just about the mechanisms through which environmental policy a¤ects …rms'and industries'decisions, but also in how we should interpret these developments following the U.S.'s withdrawal from the Paris accord. As the model shows, the increased use of clean technologies could be accompanied by an increase, rather than a decrease, in overall emissions. Hence, we should not be complacent about the fact that private …rms are investing 9 As per the parameter values, we set k d = 2, kc = 1, i = 2, i = 0. In Figure 2 we chose = :75, while in Figure 3 , we have that = 1:5. Similarly, if the stricter environmental standards at the state level are the result of lobbying by …rms whose expected pro…ts would otherwise be lower, then we should be leery about the underlying reason for the lower expected pro…ts-the possibility that the relaxed environmental standards may be reversed. If this possibility is reduced, then the mechanism could work in the opposite direction and states may adopt laxer environmental standards. 10 In sum, notwithstanding some encouraging developments about which we now have a better understanding, President Trump's decision to leave the 192-nation coalition on climate change may still undermine progress towards mitigating global warming. Di¤erentiating (28) with respect to ", we have that 
Furthermore, we have that
and < 1 () < z 2k j :
This, together with the fact that @ @kj < 0, completes the proof.
